Trust and Control with Multi-Network RF Devices

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- RF devices no longer built single-band or even single function
 - Multiple simultaneous bands
 - Multiple simultaneous networks
 - Dynamically configurable
- Mechanisms implemented for system-level coordination present opportunities for bad actors to disrupt service
- Two developments are needed:
 - Protect wireless control protocols LTE example
 - Dynamic security key generation and management



- Wireless networks increasingly use shared information to configure radios
- Bad information in the control can make the network unusable
- Insight: Multiple network observables provide context to determine trustworthiness of individual nodes
- Example: LTE eNodeB sensitivity to false/inaccurate load reports



Cell1 sends periodic false load reports to Cell2, starting at 100s



Example Reliability Inference Approach





Example Time to First Classification: Wi-Fi MAC





- Goal: Find anomalies in node's forwarding behavior based on observation of features that are robust to network changes
- Approach: Statistical Detector
 - Peer nodes capture MAC frames in promiscuous mode and observe forwarding characteristics
 - Use cross-layer information to assess forwarding behavior, synthesized in three features that are robust to network changes:
 - Forward request packet rate
 - Observability ratio
 - Drop rate
 - Entirely local and passive

Drop Rate Normal Load Fading K=11





- Traditional authentication and encryption architectures don't scale for future dynamic, multi-network uses
 - Keys susceptible to loss
 - Don't handle the variable ways in which users will want to protect information
- Time-varying network statistics can support identification and authentication



Key is, these observations are happening all the time, enabling frequent updates to shared secret